As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world,
Indonesia's response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks
is of potentially significant relevance to the United States, as
the Bush administration endeavors to build an anti-terrorist alliance.
This importance is compounded by recent reports of Osama bin Laden's
network having spread its roots to the island nation, where rising
fundamentalism and a lingering economic crisis have apparently simplified
recruiting. This combined with high levels of corruption and ineffectual
law enforcement has worried U.S. officials, who are concerned Indonesia
may become a staging area for future acts of international terrorism.
At the time of this writing, six radical Islamic groups announced
that, if the U.S. does strike Afghanistan, they will attack all
American interests in Indonesia. Recently appointed president Megawati
Soekarnoputri's first state visit to the U.S., underway at the time
of this writing, is likely to address these issues. At the same
time the Bush administration is likely to request the new president's
aid in abating the perception that America's response will be directed
against the Muslim world, a perception that the Indonesian mass
media has done little to thwart.
The Indonesian parliament is now in the process of revising the
currently unenforced journalism and broadcast laws that are largely
left over from the 32 year authoritarian rule of former president
Suharto, which ended in 1998. Following Suharto's fall from power,
media outlets reveled in new found press freedoms, but soon came
under attack from politicians and intellectuals for sensationalism
and unprofessionalism in their products. Numerous small newspapers
and radio stations rapidly appeared, catering to a variety of niche
markets, including religious fundamentalists, who were previously
denied the benefits of mass media. Current drafts of the proposed
broadcast law, which will not be enacted until 2002 or later, explicitly
forbid disparaging any religion, though it is unclear if this prohibition
applies only to the five officially accepted religions in Indonesia
(Buddhism, Catholicism, Hindu, Islam, and Protestantism).
Immediately after the September 11th terrorist attacks in New
York, Virginia and Pennsylvania, the Indonesian media was conciliatory,
and Megawati sent an official letter condemning the incidents to
the Bush administration. This initial reaction was not to last,
however, nor was Megawati's letter to prove representative of Indonesian
government as a whole. Within two days, high ranking politicians,
including the vice-president Hamzah Haz, were issuing lwarningsn
to the United States regarding its reaction. Editorials and reports
of comments by government officials published in the country's English
language daily The
Jakarta Post prompted an angry response from the U.S. ambassador
Richard Gelbard, who accused them of contributing to "an atmosphere
of misunderstanding and hatred."
At the same time, anti-American sentiment grew rapidly on radio
call-in programs, in Internet chat rooms, on student listserves
and in the mainstream Muslim press. Television reports stopped focusing
on the devastation of the attacks and the recovery effort, limiting
themselves to an assessment of Indonesians killed in the attacks
(possibly just two), and then focusing heavily on anti-Muslim violence
in the U.S. In one September 13th report, on Indonesia's 24-hour
news station Metro TV, an 'on the scene' reporter in New York was
cut off by the in-studio anchor when he began to bring up admonitions
made by President Bush and N.Y. Mayor Gulliani against prejudice
toward Muslims in the U.S. In stark contrast with the BBC and CNN,
news reports here also seem to studiously avoid reporting on evidentiary
developments in the case.
The Indonesian media's focus, which might seem curious to Americans,
may be the result of differing foundational assumptions regarding
what the goals media coverage ought to be. Here in Indonesia, factual
aspects of the case have received little media attention, replaced
by a more reputational and policy oriented discussion. In issues
of blame, Indonesian commentators have been quick to wax philosophical
about U.S. foreign policy, speculating on its role in motivating
the attacks, and are untiring in their reference to the Oklahoma
bombing case as an example of America's quickness to look for Middle
Eastern, Muslim scapegoats, when, in fact, the terrorist in that
case turned out to be domestic. In fact, the Oklahoma case seems
to blur together with the current terrorism investigation in some
reports; the influence of this widespread media representation may
have been evidenced in a recent poll by the secular news magazine
Gatra, in which
46.43% of respondents - the majority grouping - claimed that the
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks were the work of "the American
people themselves."
Many Westerners living in Indonesia have been stunned by the rapid
rise of anti-American voices in the media, following so quickly
on the heels of such a tragic event, and in a country where such
sentiments had, in recent times, remained largely below the surface.
The media, however, appears only to be responding to the popular
belief, at least among the middle and upper income Indonesians,
that the United States brought this tragedy on itself through inequitable
foreign policy and perceived anti-Muslim prejudice. The mainstream
news media has, in turn, sought to avoid undermining this popular
sentiment, while giving the perpetually 'lectured to' Indonesian
Hlite a chance to lecture the world's remaining superpower for a
change.
This apparent interest in avoiding the appearance of undermining
popular opinion and developing pan-Islamic solidarity has been handled
carefully by the mainstream broadcast media. On television news
reports and in many articles on the terrorist attacks, there is
a sense of foundationlessness and disconnection from the sort of
nuts and bolts facts that are the mainstay of Western media reports.
Many reports here have an almost postmodern tone, in that varying
accounts of the tragedy or the investigation are not treated as
having any greater import or validity as a consequence of their
apparent veracity or factual foundation. Most reports claim that
the United States, or the Bush administration, has 'decided' (memutuskan)
that Islamic militants, or Osama bin Laden, or whomever, were responsible
for the attacks. Evidence is usually described only as "not yet
clear" (belum jelas) or "speculative", without elaboration.
The opinions of local university professors, Muslim clerics, or
politicians tend to be lent more credence and certainly air-time
than do any foreign-based reports of the tragedy; this adds to the
predominance of opinion and speculation in media coverage, as opposed
to reporting, creating the impression that the facts of the case
are open to debate. Further supporting this tone are student listserves
and chat rooms that churn with conspiracy stories of Jewish control
of Western media and reports of falsehoods or slander in the Western
press that give those who search for it an excuse to ignore all
outside media.
The notion that there might be clear evidence pointing one way
or the other is not evident in most coverage, nor is the belief
that the 'truth' could be discovered in a way that would not directly
reflect the biases of those doing the 'discovering'. In a sense,
the truth of what happened is not the question, but rather only
the perceptions of various positioned parties involved in the drama.
If Western media quickly fell back on a narrative of good versus
evil in the wake of the attacks, Indonesian media has invoked a
more nuanced narrative of deception and conspiracy, in which old
actors return to play their caricatured roles, and the truth always
lies several layers beneath the surface.
Indonesia also has its fair share of mainstream, Islamicly oriented
media outlets, with circulations comparable to the secular press.
In the Islamic press, more boldly anti-American as well as anti-Semitic
stances sidestep the vagaries used by secular media. A recent editorial
in the popular newspaper Republika,
entitled "New York, Jews, and United States' Symbols," by Sidik
Jatmika, the author of a book titled America, Obstacle to Democracy,
began with this paragraph:
The superpower nation of the United States underwent
an extraordinary panic after the World Trade Center buildings in
New York collapsed and the Pentagon in Washington DC was damaged
after being hit by a kamikaze airplane. As usual, the United States
immediately looked for a scapegoat with the accusation of Middle
Eastern terrorist agents as the masterminds of the bombing of these
buildings which symbolize the glory (kejayaan) of the U.S.
Why did it have to be the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that
were targeted? Putting aside whomever really masterminded this bombing,
this article elaborates the existence of New York as a city of Jews
and a symbol of U.S. glory. This is what made the U.S. government
shocked and angry at the sudden attack of the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon: symbols of U.S. glory.
The article then went on to present a rather bitter and conspiratorial history
of Jewish involvement in U.S. history, arriving, in the end, at this
conclusion:
Jews have played a variety of roles in the early shaping
and development of the U.S., eventually causing feelings of indebtedness
among Americans toward Zionists and Israel. The U.S., in the end,
must feel thankful and maintain a good attitude toward Jews (and
Israel) to pay back the debt of Jewish contributions toward to the
progress of the U.S. ... We can only wait for the next development.
Usually, after a scapegoat has been fingered, the U.S. performs
various acts of "response" that are haphazardly [lit: like a blind
pig] carried out against the groups that have been designated the
source of the attack against these symbols of U.S. glory, regardless
of whether these targets are correct or incorrect. (my translation)
The extent of the author's research into the recent terrorist attack may be
betrayed by his reference to the event as a bombing (pengeboman)
- a misconception that remains remarkably common here in Indonesia
- but messages like this one are anything but uncommon in the mainstream
Muslim press, giving a voice to, and fueling, anti-Western resentments.
Recent polls conducted among the readerships of these publications
are as instructive, as much for the options they present as for
the results. One such survey performed by Republika described
the origin of the attacks as "speculative", and asked respondents
their opinion as to who had done it. The results are as follows,
with options presented in their original order:
Radical Jews |
34.4% |
The Red Army of Japan |
2.2% |
Osama bin Laden's group |
10.4% |
Anti-U.S. forces |
42.7% |
Domestic Terrorists |
10.3% |
Total Respondents |
2023 |
The current and ongoing Republika poll focuses on the possible results of
American military action in Afghanistan, asking "What will happen
if this military aggression goes forward?" At the time of this writing,
the results were as follows:
The U.S. buried/obliterated in Afghanistan |
47.9% |
Open war between Islam and the West |
26.4% |
Third World War Triggered |
9.7% |
Unification of Anti-U.S. terrorists |
9.7% |
Undermine efforts for peace |
6.5% |
Total Respondents |
1715 |
Although media items such as those above may surprise American
audiences, they are genuinely middle of the road examples here in
Indonesia, and do not approach the extremism seen in more fundamentalist
publications such as Sabili. On the other hand, the mainstream secular
press, including the daily Kompas,
and the weekly magazine Tempo,
tend to approach the issue more conservatively, if still from
a skeptical angle that lends significant weight to popular opinion
and local experts.
While anthropologists might be quick to assign culturally-based
explanations to Indonesia's media focus, it may be more instructive
to observe its similarities to Western media. Both are largely capitalist,
seeking to increase revenues and market share, rather than to alienate
audiences with unwelcome analyses that conflict with mainstream
belief systems. Both appeared to respond defensively to the horrendous
attack, falling back heavily on nationalistic and religious discourses,
while avoiding lines of reasoning that might implicate, however
tangentially, their own nations or religions. Both are made up of
complex media webs, ranging from mainstream broadcasting, to niche
newspapers, to local talk radio, to various Internet forms, reaching
varying self-selected audiences, mediated by social cleavages including
social class, ethnic background, religion and wealth. And both demonstrated
(and continue to demonstrate) a lamentable lack of reflexivity regarding
the nature of their own representations - their emphases, their
obfuscations and their omissions - yielding two wildly different
sorts of stories from the same tragic events.
Gareth Barkin is a doctoral candidate in cultural anthropology
at Washington University, currently conducting research on Indonesian
popular television in Jakarta.
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